COPYRIGHT REFORM AND THE DUFFY BILL by unknown
COPYRIGHT REFORM AND THE DUFFY BILL
COPYRIGHT legislation in this country and in England has been historically
designed to further the development of literary and artistic works by con-
ferring on the author, composer, or artist an exclusive property interest in
his intellectual achievement and by affording such protection to this interest
as will provide its owner a fair financial return. The beneficial effects
which were thought to flow from the interest thus conferred were deemed to
be ample justification for its inherently monopolistic character.' But with
the development of modern methods of marketing copyright material, to-
gether with the growth of radio and other media which have enormously
increased the demand for such material, there has arisen an increasing dis-
satisfaction over the operation of existing copyright laws, and, since these
laws have remained substantially unchanged since 1909,2 there has been
recurring agitation for a thorough-going revision of the present copyright
structure.3
Impetus was afforded to revision in February 1934, when the President
sent to the Senate4 the text of the International Convention of the Copy-
right Union as revised and signed at Rome in 19 2 8 ,a and recommended that
that body advise and consent to its ratification. The proper functioning of
this convention, usually known as the Bern Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, required some amendment to the existing
copyright law,3 but the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
1. U. S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, ci. 8; COPINGFR, LAW OF Cop''RIGHT (7th ed. 1936)
3; HOxBURG, LEGaAL RIGHTS OF PERFORMING ARTISTS (1934) c. I; MAncuETrr, LAw
OF THE STAGE, SCREEN, AND RADIO (1936) § 14.
2. 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §§ 1-63 (1934). Amendments were added
by: 37 STAT. 488 (1912), 37 STAT. 724 (1913), 38 STAT. 311 (1914), 41 STAT. 369
(1919), 44 STAT. 818 (1926), 45 STAT. 713 (1928).
3. Hearings before Committee on Patents on Revision of Copyright Laus (House
of Representatives), 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) passim; SEN. REP. No. 896, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 1-2; Simpson, The Copyright Situation as Affecting Radio
Broadcasting (1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rsv. 180; Solberg, The Present Copyight
Situation (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 184.
4. 78 CONG. REc. 2768 (1934), made public as Executive Order, 78 CoNG. REc.
9714 (1934).
5. CoPINGER, op. cit. supra note 1, 409-428; Register of Copyrights, Information
Circulars, 4, 4A, 4B.
6. The necessity for local legislation to effectuate the terms of the treaty depends
upon whether or not the treaty is self-executing. See ,hitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S.
190, 194 (1888); CANDALLi, TREArms, THEI MANGmG AND Eroncumsex (2d ed.
1916) 161. A similar treaty for protection of industrial property was held not self-
executing in Rousseau v. Brown, 21 App. D. C. 73 (1903). And see CmADAm, Mspra,
at 236, Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1094, 1375.
Several major changes were required. The present Section 15 requires that books
and periodicals entitled to copyright protection under the act which are in the English
language must be printed from type set in the United States. The Bill permits copyright
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tions, to whom the matter was referred, decided that entrance into the con-
vention ought to be preceded by a more exhaustive examination of the entire
copyright system for the purpose of adapting it to modern conditions.1 Dur-
ing the months prior to the opening of the Seventy-fourth Congress in
January 1935, an interdepartmental committee composed of representatives
of the Departments of State and Commerce and the Copyright office of the
Library of Congress held hearings for all those interested in the copyright
field, with a view toward drafting the desired legislation.3 Finally, in April
1935,9 Senator F. Ryan Duffy of Wisconsin introduced his first copyright
bill. 10 This was later withdrawn n and another substituted 12 with minor
changes. The latter bill was passed by the Senate 13 but was not reported
out by the House Committee on Patents before the close of the Seventy-
fourth Congress. An identical bill has been introduced in the Senate of the
new Congress,14 but no action has as yet been taken by the Committee on
Patents to which it was referred.
The Duffy Bill, as it now stands, represents several substantial changes in
our present copyright law. In dealing with both the domestic and inter-
national situation, it purports to strike a fair balancp between advantages
and disadvantages to the producers and consumers of copyrighted material.
Of primary advantage to producer organizations are the provisions of the Bill
relating to membership in the Bern Convention. Although originally desired
by both the creators and consumers of literary and artistic works, 1 adher-
ence to the Convention is now considered of value primarily to the former
for foreigners without American printing in order to satisfy the Bern Convention require-,
ments, but requires it for ultimate distribution. S. 7, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) § 11.
Other changes enacted for a similar reason concern divisibility of copyright and copy-
right without formality. See p. 435, infra. For discussions of these changes, see
Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 469, 485, 1104.
An additional source of possible conflict may be found in the concept of moral
rights or rights against mutilation of a copyright work which pertains abroad. See
COPINGER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 414.
It has been strenuously argued that if the treaty is not self-executing the Bill fails
in its purpose because the changes do not comply with the requirements of the Con-
vention. See Hearings, supra, 1078 et seq.
7. SEN. REP. No. 896, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 2.
8. SEN. ExEc. REP. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 4-5.
9. 79 CONG. REc. 4727 (1935).
10. S. 2465, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
11. 79 CONG. Rzc. 9257 (1935).
12. S. 3047, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
13. 79 CoNG. REc. 12615 (1935).
14. S. 7, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). The Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions approved on Nov. 26, 1937, the proposal for a treaty which would allow the
United States to enter the Union as revised in Rome in 1928. See 132 PUnLxSnEaS
WEEKLY (1937) 2127.
15. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 399.
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group.16 Membership by the United States will obtain for our authors and
composers the same rights under foreign law that nationals of the forty-six
signatory powers have in their own countries. 17 In addition, both the Con-
vention' and the Duffy Bill 19 provide for automatic copyright, or copyright
without formality, by which the mere fact of creation of a copyrightable
work will constitute a copyright in every foreign country adhering to the
Union. Although the bill would seem to discriminate against our own
nationals, who do not obtain the advantages of copyright without formality,
reciprocal advantages of automatic copyright abroad would be of great value
to American producers of copyrighted material, since their work is now
frequently pirated in foreign countries because of the severe limitations on
formal copyright resulting from distance and language difficulties.20 Of equal
value to American authors and song writers are the provisions of the Duffy,
Bill relating to divisibility of copyright.2 ' Whereas the present law makes
no specific provision for an assignment of only part of the rights and privi-
leges inhering in a copyright2- and leaves the efficacy of partial assignments
to the more uncertain rules of case law,-8 the proposed bill specifically pro-
vides that such interests may be granted away. Not only are the distinct
rights in a copyrighted work separately alienable, but the bill extends the
principle of divisibility even further and provides that assignment of copy-
rights may, at the owners' discretion, be limited to a part of the entire term
and to specific localities.
In spite of these concessions the creators of copyrightable works have placed
themselves on record as being almost unanimously opposed to the Duffy
Bill. 24 So intense is their opposition to the Bill as a whole that even mem-
16. SEN. REP. No. 896, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 3; Duffy, International Copy-
right (1937) 8 AIR L R. 213; Solberg, Copyright Law Reform (1925) 35 Y~t.n L J.
48; Solberg, The International Copyright Union (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 68; Solberg,
The Present Copyright Situation (1930) 40 YALE L J. 184. See also speech by
Senator Duffy before the Section of International and Comparative Law of the Ameri-




20. See Duffy, International Copyright (1937) 8 Am L REv. 213, 216; Hearings,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 239. See statement by Margaret Mitchell concerning the pirating
in Holland of "Gone With the Wind," 132 PumBmLsHrs VE Ly (1937) 2282.
21. §24.
22. 35 STAT. 1084 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §42 (1934).
23. See Fitch v. Young, 230 Fed. 743 (S. D. N. Y. 1916), aff'd, 239 Fed. 1021
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1917). Compare Standard Music Roll Co. v. F. A. Mills, Inc., 241 Fed.
360 (CC. A. 3rd, 1917), and Coca-Cola Co. v. State, 225 S. AV. 791 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920), with Ford v. Chas. F_. Blaney Amusement Co., 148 Fed. 642 (S.D.N.Y.1906)
and 1. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Aiiusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E. D. S. C. 1924).
24. For an attack on almost every provision of the Bill, see brief filed by Mr.
Nathan Burkan in behalf of the American Society for Composers, Authors and Pub-
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bership in the International Union, previously advocated, is now attacked
as undesirable. It is argued that due to present racial restrictions in some
foreign countries, coupled with limitations on exchange in many more, the
American composers and authors have very little to gain by United States
adherence to the Bern Convention.25 Actually, however, other reasons moti-
vate this attack upon the Convention, for it is clear that the sensible way
to cope with racial and exchange restrictions is by treaty and negotiation ;"
aloofness cannot better the position of the American artist abroad and may
give only additional incentive to foreign infringement and retaliatory legis-
lation. Behind the almost unanimous producer opposition to membership
in the convention is a more profound antagonism to the Duffy Bill on the
ground that it is an "infringer's bill. ' 27 Irrespective of the truth of this
contention, it is undeniable that a number of -the provisions of the Bill are
concessions to user organizations.2 8 Most important of these concessions, and
consequently most provocative of vitrolic criticism,29 is the elimination of the
minimum damage clause"0 which has long been recognized as the mainstay
of copyright protection.
Provision for minimum damages in copyright legislation is not merely an
experimental device first conceived of in the present act in the United States.
Actually, it is older than copyright law itself, for the Stationers' Company,
holder of a monopoly on printed matter by letters patent from the king,
incorporated in its by-laws, in 1681, a provision that any member who
printed a book previously registered with the company by another member
was to forfeit to the organization the sum of twelve pence for each unauthor-
ized copy printed.3 ' But the regulation of the Stationers' Company was of
lishers, Hearhigs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1093 et seq. And see briefs submitted by the
various industries affected by the Bill. Hearings, mpra, at 1402 et seq.
25. Id., at 238, 242.
26. Id., at 263.
27. See e.g., Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1087.
28. Among the provisions of the Bill which have been attacked by copyright
owners are: § 17(g) (1) (exemption of performances by charitable institutions) ; § 17(g)
(2) (exemption of performances by wired radio); § 17(g) (4) (exemption of incidental
infringement in current event performances); § 3 (extension of compulsory licensing
to phonograph recorders). These and many other provisions of the Bill are fully
discussed and criticised in briefs submitted in behalf of ASCAP. See Hearings, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 102-139; 1102-1122.
29. See Hearings, op. cit. mpra note 3, at 115, 1106, 1187. In his testimony before
the committee, Sidney M. Kaye, Attorney for the National Association of Broadcasters
advanced the proposition that "the opposition to the Bern Convention on the part of
ASCAP is another smokescreen, and that their real ground for opposition to this
Bill remains the elimination of the onerous minimum damage clause." Hearings, supra,
at 399.
30. The minimum damage provision appears in the present Copyright Act as
35 STAT. 1081 (1909), 17 U.S.C. § 25(b) (1934).
31. BnuRRu, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BooKs (1899) 79.
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course not binding on non-members, and, with the expiration of the monopoly,
country printers and unscrupulous booksellers combined to reprint and sell
pirated editions of the works of the more popular authors. Due to the opera-
tion of the previous monopoly, the authors had been forced to sell their
rights to the members of the company, who now found these rights virtually
valueless, since the actual sales of pirated editions were difficult to discover
and real damages almost impossible to prove.32 The booksellers of the com-
pany, therefore, clamored for assistance from Parliament, and, as a result of
their frequent petitions, the so-called Statute of Anne,33 the first copyright
law, was passed in 1709. It provided for a registration procedure similar
to that in modem statutes, but of most significance to the booksellers were
the provisions that infringing copies were to be turned over to the owner
of the copyright to destroy, and the defendant required to forfeit one penny
for each sheet found in his custody, the proceeds to be divided equally be-
tween the crown and the plaintiff in the action.
In this country, twelve of the original thirteen colonies passed copyright
legislation with the form and phraseology of the Statute of Anne as a model,34
but with the adoption of the Federal Constitution the necessity for state
legislation disappeared. 35 The first federal copyright law was enacted in
1790,36 and this, too, was based on its English predecessor. The statutory
dimage clause of this act37 provided that for every infringement of a copy-
righted map, chart, or book, the infringing copies should be forfeited and
destroyed and the infringer required to pay fifty cents per sheet, one half
of the sum recovered going to the government and the other half to the
author. The first general revision of this act 38 increased the forfeiture to
one dollar per sheet for the infringement of prints, cuts, engravings, maps,
charts and musical compositions, but maintained the old rate as to books.
The outstanding characteristic of this early copyright legislation relating
to statutory damages was that the statutes specified a fixed sum to be
forfeited for each infringement and consequently foreclosed the possibility
of a civil action for provable loss.39 Although damage actions had earlier
been peimitted by statute for unauthorized publication of hitherto unpub-
lished manuscripts,40 the first real damage clause for infringement of copy-
32. See id., at 90; Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2317 (K. B. 1769).
33. 8 Anne c. 19 (1709). See Tonson v. Collins, 1 Black. IV. 321 (1761).
34. For a collection of these statutes, see SOLazaG, COPYMGnT EXAcrmzTs oF TEM
Ux=zn STATEs (1906) 1-30.
35. U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 8, cl. & But see Sorsn., op. dt. supra note 34, at
105-112, for later state statutes designed to protect property interests in uncopyrighted
works.
36. 1 STAT. 124 (1750).
37. Id., § 2.
38. 4 STAT. 436 (1831).
39. 'Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (U. S. 1834) ; Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S.
244 (1888) ; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339 (1903).
40. E.g., 1 STAT. 125 (1790).
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righted material appeared in the amendments to the copyrightt law of 1856,
41
which provided that damages might be obtained for infringement of a dra-
matic composition by public performance or representation. And even here
the act did not provide for simple common law damages but introduced
a statutory minimum, $100 for the first infringement and $50 for each sub-
sequent one. In the general revision of 1870,42 however, the civil action for
proven damages was extended to infringements of copyrighted books; simple
common law damage principles, without any statutory limitations, were to
be applied. The provisions of previous acts relating to infringement of the
copyright of musical or dramatic compositions remained unchanged by the
revision.
In 1909, Congress once again overhauled the system of copyright laws
and provided for the minimum damage clause as we know it today.43 Section
25 of the statute, which applies equally to all infringements, 44 provides the
owner of the copyright with alternative remedies. He may enjoin a threatened
infringement of his rights; he may maintain a civil action for the recovery
of provable damages and profits made by the infringer from his wrongful
act; or he may seek to recover "in lieu of actual damages and profits" an
award to be determined by the court's discretion, but which shall in no
case be less than $250 nor more than $5,000. 45 Within these limits coni-
mon law principles of damage may apply, although here, too, the court's
discretion is guided by schedules evaluating the different types of infringe-
ment.46 While there was some slight hesitancy in the earliest cases 47 arising
41. 11 STAT. 138 (1856); cf. Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148 (1899). The provisions
of the act were extended to public performance of a musical composition. 29 STAT. 481
(1897).
42. 16 STAT. 212 (1870). For a more detailed historical survey, see Solberg, Copy-
right Law Reform (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 48.
43. The act was amended in 1912 to protect motion picture rights. 37 STAT. 489.
44. The unauthorized newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph, how-
ever, gives a minimum damage of only $50 and a maximum of $200; innocent infringe-
ment of non-dramatic or undramatized work by means of motion pictures has a maximum
of $100 and no minimum.
45. Whether actual or statutory damages should be awarded is determined by the
trial court. Fargo Mercantile Co. v. Brechet & Richter Co., 295 Fed. 823 (C, C. A.
8th, 1924). But where both are readily ascertainable the court should choose actual
damages as the appropriate remedy. Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co.,
27 F. (2d) 556 (D. Mass. 1928). But see DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAw
(1925) 165.
46. The function of these guides within the fixed limits is explained in Jewell-
LaSalle Realty Co. v. Buck et al., 283 U. S. 202 (1931); Waterson, Berlin & Snyder
Co. v. Tollefson, 253 Fed. 859 (S. D. Cal. 1918).
47. Woodman v. Lydiard-Peterson Co., 192 Fed. 67 (S. D. Minn. 1912); Mills,
Inc. v. Standard Music Roll Co., 223 Fed. 849 (D. N. J. 1915), aff'd, 241 Fed. 360
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1917); Alfred Decker Cohn Co, v. Etchison Hat Co., 225 Fed. 135
(E. D. Va. 1915); see Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 233 Fed. 609, 611
(C.C.A. 6th, 1916).
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under Section 25, the courts have almost unanimously followed the decision
of the Supreme Court in L. A. Westermnann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 4
and have enforced the minimum damage provisions irrespective of whether
any actual damage has been shown. And though the amount of the award
will depend upon the facts of each case, the courts have recognized that
their discretion is limited by the minimum and maximum provisions of the
statute.
49
The ultimate recognition of the principle of statutory damages outlined
above was largely predicated upon the historic argument that the awards
as determined by the statutes were not unreasonable, since they seldom com-
pensated the copyright owner for his expenses in curtailing infringement;'O
but an appraisal of the present utility of the dause must necessarily com-
prehend an examination of its operation upon the exdsting copyright scene.
Preliminary to such an examination it is important to understand the various
types of copyright interests which the proprietor is forced to protect. There
are two primary rights in copyrighted books, plays, or musical compositions,
the sale of which must constitute the major sources of revenue available to
the copyright owner. Of these two, the right to publish or reproduce the
subject of the copyright was originally the most substantial. The second,
the right of public performance, was of some value to holders of copyrights
in dramatic compositions, since any unlicensed public performance consti-
tuted an infringement under the Act of 1909 ;r but it was of no practical
worth to the composers of music since they possessed solely the rights to
public performance for profit, 2 these being thought to include only per-
formances for which an admission fee was charged.53 Consequently enter-
48. 249 U. S. 100 (1919).
49. Berlin v. Daigle, 31 F. (2d) 832 (C.C.A. 5th, 1929); Hendricks Co. v.
Thomas Publishing Co., 242 Fed. 37 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1917) ; Witmark & Sons v. Calloway,
22 F. (2d) 412 (E. D. Tenn. 1927). The trial court has complete discretion and if
within the statutory limits it will not be reviewed by the appellate court. Douglas v.
Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207 (1935); Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F. (2d) 993 (C.C. A.
2nd, 1937). Contra: Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley, 252 Fed. 749 (C. C. A. 9th,
1918).
Where the statutory minimum appeared unfair under the circumstances, however,
some courts have refused to award counsel fees [Fisher v. Dillingham, 293 Fed. 145
(S. D. N. Y. 1924)], or have made them unusually small [Cravens v. Retail Credit
Men's Ass'n, 26 F. (2d) 833 (M. D. Tenn. 1924)]. But see Witfnark & Sons v. Cal-
loway, 22 F. (2d) 412, 415 (E. D. Tenn. 1927).
50. See Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207, 209 (1935) ; BmaM, op. cit. supra
note 31, at c. III; WEl-, A umCAN COPYRIGHT LAw (1917) 476.
51. 35 STAT. 1081 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 1 (d) 1934.
52.' Id., § 1(e).
53. John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 Fed. 229 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1915);
Herbert v. The Shanley Co., 229 Fed. 340 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1916); see Simpson, The
Copyright Situation as Affecting Radio Broadcasting (1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rnv.
180, 188.
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tainments in hotels, restaurants, cabarets, night clubs, and roadhouses, which
were considered merely incidental to the operation of the premises, were
exempt from any copyright limitations. The right of the composer in the
public performance of his music took on a new importance, however, in
1917, when in the case of Herbert v. The Shanley Co.,54 the Supreme Court
extended the scope of copyright protection by holding that music played to
attract patronage constituted a public performance for profit within the
meaning of the Copyright Act, even though the public did not pay directly
for the privilege of hearing it." Moreover, this extension was soon followed
by another, for in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.,5 the Supreme Court
promulgated the doctrine of second user, holding that, when a radio broad-
cast or phonograph recording 57 is heard publicly and for profit under the
broad definition of the Herbert case, the retransmission amounts to a second
performance, actionable under the statute.5s As a result of these decisions,
the performing rights possessed by the composer of a copyrighted piece of
music became as important a source of revenue as the publication rights
formerly had been.
The distinction between the two types of rights in copyrighted works is
of importance chiefly because it forms the basis of two somewhat divergent
methods of protecting copyright interests. When the author of a book or
composer of a song wishes a financial return for the publication or repro-
duction rights in his product, he will negotiate with various publishers, motion
picture companies, and possibly phonograph recorders" 9 until an arrange-
54. 242 U. S. 591 (1917).
55. The case of Herbert v. The Shanley Co., 229 Fed. 340 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1916)
involved performance of copyrighted music in restaurants and hotels. It was followed
by several other cases which extended the doctrine to music played in motion picture
theatres [Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E. D. Pa. 1922); Witmark & Sons v. Pastime
Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E. D. S. C. 1924), aff'd, 2 F. (2d) 1020 (C. C. A. 4th,
1934) ], and over the radio [Witmark & Sons v. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed, 776 (D. N. J.
1923); Remick & Co. v. American Auto Accessories Co., 5 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 6th,
1925)]. See Simpson, supra note 53, at 189, 190. But see (1936) 7 AIR L. REv. 115.
56. 283 U. S. 191 (1931); Simpson, spra note 53, at 192; Comments (1931) 20
CALIF. L. REV. 77; (1932) 12 B. U. L. REV. 243; (1931) 26 ILL. L. REV. 443; cf. Per-
forming Right Soc. Ltd. v. Hammond's Bradford Brewery Co. Ltd., 176 L. T. 312
(1933), (1934) 47 H~av. L. REv. 703.
57. Although the case actually involved only a radio broadcast, the decision states
that phonograph recordings constitute a second performance and, if unauthorized, an
infringement. See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198, 201 (1931).
58. The decision in the LaSalle case may, however, be limited to the precise fact situa-
tion in that case. The radio station broadcasting the song was likewise unlicensed, and
the Court pointed out that it was not deciding the case in which the original perform-
ance was authorized by the copyright owner. See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.,
283 U. S. 191, 199, n. 5; cl. Buck v. Debaum, 40 F. (2d) 734 (S. D. Cal. 1929).
59. Negotiation with phonograph recorders is limited by § I(e) of the Copyright
Act, which provides that upon granting authorization for a mechanical reproduction of
a copyrighted work, the copyright owner is limited to a royalty of two cents on repro-
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ment is reached which is satisfactory to both parties concerned. In the
case of infringement by some competing agency, the original owner of the
copyright, or his licensee or vendee, wili personally bring an action against
the infringer. In this situation the identity of the defendant together with
the fact of infringement will usually be readily ascertainable, for the printed
copies or reproductions afford tangible evidence of the violations. In some
instances, since it may even be possible to establish the amount of profits
made by the infringer, the plaintiff need only rely on his statutory right to
maintain a civil action for damages. In the more usual case, however, the
damages suffered by the owner of the copyright will be incapable of legal
proof, and where a book is reprinted in a current serial, or a popular piece
of music prematurely recorded by a phonograph company, the author or
composer may often have to rely entirely upon his right to collect a statutory
award under Section 25 of the Copyright Act.
An interesting example of the operation of the minimum damage provision
in this connection is furnished by the motion picture industry. Although the
copyright situation in this particular field is somewhat complicated by the
fact that motion picture producers are both consumers and creators of copy-
right material, the system of marketing films which has been developed in
that industry is peculiarly dependent upon the effective operation of the
copyright law. Each exhibitor is licensed by the distributors to show certain
films a given number of times on specific dates. In the event that one of
the exhibitors refuses to comply with the terms of his license, as e.g., by
retaining a particular film beyond the specified time, the distributor's only
practical remedy is an action brought under the statutory damage provision
of Section 25.60 If he merely refuses to send further films to the infringing
exhibitor, the latter may obtain additional films from a competing distributor,
who cannot refuse him for fear of prosecution under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.61 The use of an injunction against the infringer would be equally
unavailing, for the infringement would be completed long before the injunc-
tion could be obtained. Nor would the distributor obtain the necessary redress
in a contract action for provable damages against the exhibitor, since the
damage results not so much from the loss of the license fee as in the dis-
ruption of distribution schedules, the disregard of the licensing system,
ductions by other companies. The negotiation is thus limited to the value of the right
to be first in the market with a given musical number, since other rights in the me-
chanical production are worth no more than two cents per record.
60. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Grobaski, 46 F. (2d) 813 (NV. D. Mich. 1931); Tiffany
Productions, Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F. (2d) 911 (D. Md. 1931), (1931) 31 CoL L. REv.
1187; cf. Pathe Exchange, Inc. v. Dalke, 49 F. (2d) 161 (C. C.A. 4th, 1931); Metro-
Goldwyn-fayer Distributing Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., Inc., 59 F. (2d) 70 (C.C. A.
1st, 1932), reVrg, 50 F. (2d) 908 (D. M[ass. 1931), (1931) 45 HAnv. L. REv. 380.
61. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1934); cf. United States v. First
National Pictures, 282 U. S. 44 (1930); Paramount-Famous Lasky Corp. v. United
States, 282 U. S. 30 (1930).
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the violation of priority of exhibition contracted for by other exhibitors,
the possibility of a "dark theater" for subsequent exhibition because of the
delay in returning a print, and, finally, the expense of the vigil necessary
to detect and follow up such infringements. 2 An action for the recovery
of statutory damages, however, is subject to none of the defects which
characterize the other remedies open to the distributor. Not only does it
afford a summary method of obtaining reasonable retribution, but it acts
as an effective deterrent to further violation of the distributor's marketing
system, since the exhibitor will rarely persist in infringing if he knows
that he will be liable for at least $250 for each offense.
Although a statutory damage provision may often be a necessary inci-
dent of the protection of publication and reproduction rights in a copyrighted
article, it is indispensable to adequate enforcement of performing rights in
a musical composition. Protection of these rights is subject to practical
limitations which have made enforcement difficult and at times impossible.03
In the first place, the intangible nature of the property interest represented
by the performing right renders the possibility of proving actual infringe-
ments extremely hazardous, for the violation of proprietory interests by an
orchestra or radio leaves no physical evidence of the appropriation. But,
aside from difficulties of proof, the protection of performing rights is subject
to a further handicap which arises from the multiplicity of consumer organ-
izations, such as restaurants, night clubs, and roadhouses. With each one of
these organizations constituting a potential source of infringement, an indi-
vidual copyright owner would clearly be incapable of curtailing wholesale
appropriation of his interest. If, therefore, the protection of performing rights
were left solely to individual initiative the copyright proprietor might well
be placed in the anomalous position of possessing a property interest in the
right to perform under his copyright but of being unable to protect that
interest sufficiently to realize any return upon it.
These hazards actually proved so real that there was virtually no enforce-
ment of the law against infringers of the composer's performing rights in
his music until 1914,6 when, under the leadership of Victor Herbert, the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, popularly known
as ASCAP, was formed.05 The function of this Society was the promotion
of collective marketing of performing rights in music in the United States.
To it now belong the leading composers, authors and publishers of music,
with a unanimity which approximates a monopoly of the field. 0 The mem-
bers assign to the Society all their non-dramatic performing rights for a
62. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1187; see Sargay, The Case of the Copyright
Law and the Motion Picture, 123 MoTioN Plcrutr HERALD, May 23, 1936, p. 12.
63. Id., at 61, 75.
64. Id., at 8, 193; SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT (1933) 221.
65. SHAFTER, id., at 222.
66. See (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 370, 373.
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period of five years, and it in turn licenses the various commercial users of
music by means of a blanket license which allows the licensee unlimited use
of all music in the ASCAP catalogue. 6* The members are then ranked in
several groups according to the relative popularity and demand for their
work and upon this basis receive a proportionate share of the royalties col-
lected from the licensees. ASCAP was hailed by both the creators and con-
sumers of copyrighted music from its inception.68 For the former, it suc-
cessfully marketed performing rights and produced a financial return where
previously there had been only wholesale infringement. For the latter, faced
with the practical impossibility of securing sufficient licenses from individual
composers, it provided a license sufficiently comprehensive to permit the
extensive repertoire required by modern entertainment demands without the
fear of infringement litigation.
In spite of the almost universal recognition of the need for an organization
like ASCAP in the entertainment field, the fact that the Society virtually
controls the right to conduct public musical performances for profit and that
it has behind it the strong coercive powers of the minimum damage clause
in Section 25 of the copyright law, has created considerable public animosity
toward the organization.70 When the Society is informed through its exten-
sive network of investigators 7l throughout the country that some unlicensed
theatre or cafe or hotel is using copyrighted music, it writes a letter inform-
ing the proprietor that he is violating the law and suggesting that he take
out a license. The relevant sections of the copyright law are quoted, the
leading cases cited, and the definition of "performance for profit" as laid
down by the Supreme Court in Hcrbert v. The Shanlcy Co., reported in full.
If there is no response, additional letters in much the same tone follow, with
perhaps more emphasis on the possibility of a suit under Section 25. Finally,
if the proprietor persists in disregarding these warnings, suit is brought for
infringement.72 Realizing that under the minimum damage provision theie
can be no defense to this action, however, the proprietor will usually capitulate
before trial and obtain a license from the SocietyY But even when judg-
ment has been finally entered, the Society very rarely attempts to recover
upon it, and generally compromises for the cost of a license to the infringer
from the time the infringement was first discovered plus the expenses of the
investigation and suit.74 Thus, although the minimum damage clause is
seldom employed to recover substantial sums from unauthorized users of
67. Hearing-, op. cit. supra note 3, at 19.
68. SHAFn, op. cit. supra note 64, at 222.
69. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 26, 596.
70. Id., at 481.
71. SHArm , op. cit. supra note 64, at 224-225.
72. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 816-829.
73. Id., at 772.
74. Id., at 233, 772. In the twenty-two years of its existence up to 1936, ASCAP
has actually collected only 8,800 on minimum damage judgments. Id., at 27.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
copyrighted music, it does operate to compel compliance with the demands
of the Society for licensing.
In addition to these objections to its coercive power, ASCAP is open
to the usual attacks made upon monopolistic enterprises.75 Indeed, the very
effectiveness of the minimum damage provision, as it has been utilized by
the Society, strongly suggests that unrestrained application of the clause may
give rise to abuse of the copyright privileges which it was designed to pro-
tect. In the first place, the methods adopted by ASCAP to secure licensees
probably have added to the cost of conducting public entertainment, and this
is probably passed along to the public. Furthermore, because of its almost
exclusive operation in the field of performing rights, ASCAP is in an ex-
tremely strong bargaining position with respect to its individual licensees. 70
In conducting negotiations relating to the formation of license agreements,
the Society, unrestrained by the healthy moderative effect of competitive bid-
ding, is free to exact whatever terms it thinks reasonable, and if the prospective
licensee wishes to continue to use music, he must accede to these terms or
subject himself to the risk of incurring a heavy statutory liability. Although
this inequality of bargaining power is probably subject to an exception in
the case of the Society's more powerful customers, notably the radio, it is
particularly, offensive to the small consumer of music for profit who can rely
only on the alleged benevolent attitude of the Society toward its various
licensees.
77
The extent of ASCAP's altruism can only be a matter of conjecture, but
it is significant to note that although the Duffy Copyright Bill was designed
as a comprehensive revision of the entire copyright law, the hearings on the
Bill before the House Committee on Patents developed into an extensive
attack upon, and defence of, the Society. The underlying hypothesis of the
proponents of the Bill is roughly that in order to prevent copyright pro-
prietors from exercising their monopolistic power in a manner subversive
to the general welfare, it is necessary to weaken the various protective de-
vices hitherto afforded by the copyright statute. The authors of the Bill
have attempted to attain this objective in two significant ways. First, the
Bill provides that in an action for the recovery of profits made by the
defendant as a result of the infringement, the proprietor shall be permitted
to recover all or only such part of these profits "as the court may decree to
be just and proper,'' 78 whereas previously he was awarded all profits. 79
Secondly, the Bill provides that where the proprietor seeks an award in lieu
of damages, he shall be given merely " . . . such damages . . . as shall
in the opinion of the court be sufficient to prevent their operation as a
75. Id., at 484.
76. See note 60 supra.
77. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 26.
78. S. 7, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) § 17.
79. 35 STAT. 1081 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 25(b) (1934).
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license to infringe, and as shall be just, proper, and adequate, in view of the
circumstances of the case . . . " No minimum is set but the maximum
possible award is raised from $5,000 to $20,000 for each infringement.s
The first of these two suggested amendments is based upon the supposi-
tion that in the case of a partial infringement of copyright privileges, the
infringer ought not to be subjected to a liability determined by the total
profits which he has derived from the completed work. But although the
existing provision of the statute may occasionally result in inequitable awards,
it has the double advantage of deterring infringement and of being compara-
tively simple to administer. The proposed amendment would seem to be
deficient in both respects, for not only is it practically impossible to allo-
cate that portion of the total profits which has been derived from the
partial infringement, but the provision in its present form would operate as
a virtual invitation to infringe. It is conceivable that an infringer might
steal a short scene from a book or a play, or that a popular serial magazine
might reproduce a whole story which would contribute ten percent to the
length of the infringing publication and ninety percent to its commercial
success. Since the copyright proprietor would probably be unable to prove
the relationship between the infringement and the ultimate public demand for
the publication as a whole, the infringer might find that he was in a better
position financially after having defended an action for profits received than
if he had refrained from the infringement and had secured a license pre-
liminary to the publication.
Although the provisions of the Duffy Bill relating to the apportionment
of profits are important in connection with civil actions for provable damages,
the proposed elimination of the minimum damage provision is of far greater
general significance, since the right to sue for statutory damages applies to
the more usual situation where actual losses cannot be shown. During the
hearings, emphasis was laid on the high license fees made possible by the
statutory damage provision, and there was some support for the argument
that these rates bear a direct relation to the amount of the minimum award
provided under the clause.8' As already indicated, however, in actual practice
the amount realizable by a copyright proprietor from his copyright interest
depends on a variety of circumstances which vary considerably according to
the particular type of interest concerned. In the case of the license or sale
of the publication or reproduction rights in a book, play, or musical com-
position, the determinative factor will usually be the demand that the author
may arouse for his particular product. In short, the owner of the copyright
will accept the highest of the various bids which he may receive from the
numerous publishers, motion picture producers, and phonograph recorders
to whom he may submit the copyrighted article.
80. See note 78 mspra.
81. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 228, et seq.
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It is only in connection with the marketing of performing rights in copy-
righted music that competition fails to reduce excessive license fees, 2 and
even in this field it is doubtful whether fees are determined by the amount
of the statutory award. ASCAP has developed an extraordinarily efficient
method of curtailing infringement of its copyrights, and it is conceivable that
the Society might raise its rates to a point which would force prospective
licensees to run the risk of infringement litigation rather than submit to the
license terms.8 3 With so severe a penalty for infringement, it is, therefore,
theoretically possible that the Society would set rates out of all proportioh
to the benefits obtained by licensees. This eventuality would be highly un-
likely, however, since its effect would be abandonment of musical entertain-
ment by the small consumers and consequent diminution of total returns to
ASCAP. ASCAP's rates must be determined by an estimate of what the
various types of licensees will pay for the benefits secured, and, although
this approximation might well result in unjustifiably high rates, an examina-
tion of ASCAP'S license agreements and of its total annual return fails to
disclose any arbitrary use of its monopolistic powers8s4 In spite of the obvious
emotional appeal of an attack on monopoly, the argument for abolishing
the minimum damage clause on this ground is scarcely conclusive. The
value of the statutory damage provision lies not so much in the fact that
it affords injured copyright owners occasional redress for past infringements
or a greater income from license fees, but rather in the fact that the threat
of its application operates to deter potential infringements. To this extent,
the clause may be considered coercive in character, but since it affords needed
82. This does not mean that ASCAP is the only performing rights society in the
United States. There are several others which primarily control foreign music. Hear-
ings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 475. Some competition may take place between these
societies, and between users seeking the music of composers who deal individually, but
it is negligible. ASCAP controls virtually all American music that is in demand for
constant performance. See note 63 supra.
83. See Hearings, op. cit. mipra note 3, at 988.
84. Some typical rates are:
For theatres:
800 seats or less, 10 cents a seat per year.
800-1600 seats, 15 cents a seat per year.
1600 or more seats, 20 cents a seat per year.
For hotels:
$40-$2,800 per year depending on size, number of public rooms using music,
number of private receivers in bedrooms.
For radio:
$3,239,181 paid by all radio chains to ASCAP in 1936, the fee of each station
being based on power of station, hours on air, and estimated population
coverage.
See Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 13, 14, 19, 106, 597. And see (1937) AsCAr
JoURNAL 17, 24. For a comparison of the rates charged by ASCAP and the total
receipts of its licensees, see Hearings, supra, at 1111.
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protection to contractual obligations and property interests, some such clause
must be considered a necessary adjunct to a workable copyright law.
While the present combination of ASCAP and the minimum statutory
damage clause do not appear to present the dangers and inequities sometimes
charged against them, other disadvantages appear to result from certain
defects inherent in the provision itself. The major objection of the large
consumers of copyrighted works is not that the minimum damage clause
makes for exorbitant license rates or that ASCAP exerts any coercive force
on its licensees, but rather that the.Act imposes too severe a penalty for too
broad a series of infractions.85 Since knowledge of the copyright or intention
to infringe are immaterial 86 under judicial interpretation81 of the Section,
unavoidable infringement is punished equally with deliberate piracy of copy-
righted music.88 For example, it is almost impossible to determine within
a reasonable time whether or not an unpublished composition has been copy-
righted and, if so, by whom. 9 But the use of such music is equally action-
able with that which is published. Furthermore, small orchestras, unaware
of the intricacies of the law, are often not sufficiently discriminating in their
choice of music. If they happen to infringe, it is the proprietor of the estab-
lishment who must pay the $250 minimum,90 and although a program of
85. Hcarings, op. cit. mpra note 3, at 373, 401, 407.
86. Under §25(b), however, "in the case of the infringement of an undramatized
or non-dramatic work by means of motion pictures, where the infringer shall show that
he was not aware that he was infringing and that such infringement could not have
been reasonably foreseen, such damages shall not exceed the sum of $100 . . .
Furthermore there are no limitations of maximum damage under § 25 where actual
notice has been served on the infringer. Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley, 252 Fed. 749
(C. C. A. 9th, 1918); Sebring Pottery Co. v. Steubenville Pottery Co., 9 F. Supp. 383
(N. 1D. Ohio 1932).
Willfulness to infringe is also necessary to impose the criminal penalties of the
Act. 35 STAT. 1082 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §28 (1934). Cf. United States v. Schmidt,
15 F. Supp. 804 (M. D. Pa. 1936); United States v. Marx Bros., N. Y. Times, Oct.
31, p. 1, col. 4. These two are apparently the only prosecutions under the criminal
provisions of the Act.
87. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191 (1931); see A-xnun, CoPY-
RIGHT LAW AND PRACrlCE (1936) 685; DRONE, THE Lw oF P oPm y IN IN=TELEUAL
PRODUCTIONs (1879) 401, 403, 638; WFI., ArmicAw COPYRIGHT LAw (1917) 401.
-88. Actually, of course, where the infringement is unavoidable and the actual
damage trifling, the court will confine itself to the minimum. See Warren v. White
& Vyckoff Mfg. Co., 39 F. (2d) 922, 923 (S. D. N. Y. 1930); AMUDIn, op. cit. Supra
note 87, at 1136; (1937) 37 CoL L. Rxv. 487.
89. 35 STAT. 1078 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 11 (1934). See Hcarings, op. cit. .,pra
note 3, at 1120. For a discussion of the effect of automatic copyright on broadcasters,
see id., at 467.
90. Berlin v. Daigle, 26 F. (2d) 149 (E. D. La. 1928); Dreamland Ball Room
V. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) ; cf. Gross v. Van Dyk:
Gravure Co., 230 Fed. 412 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276
(E. D. Pa. 1922) ; Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E. D.
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dance music broadcast from a hotel or restaurant is often submitted in ad-
vance-, a last minute request may be substituted in spite of strict orders to
the contrary -and an infringement occurs. 91 Here, it is the broadcasters1
2
who must pay at least the minimum damage, possibly for each of the
ultimate transmitting stations.03 The larger chains employ listeners, famiiliar
with copyrighted music, who are prepared to tune out the offending orchestra
as soon as they detect an infringement, 94 but the cost of such a service would
be prohibitive for the smaller stations. Still more inequitable, it is charged,
is the situation where a secondary user under the definition of the Jewell-
LaSalle case may pick up through his radio a band playing copyrighted
music without authorization from the owner. 5 He, too, under the strict
interpretation of the law, would be guilty of an infringement, and the courts
would have no alternative but to award a judgment for $250 against him
in the event of suit for statutory damages. 9 With some copyrights owned
by authors and others by publishers 97 innocent infringement may be fre-
quent. Furthermore, it is possible for members to leave ASCAP after their
agreements have terminated, and, before notification may be given the licensees,
much unauthorized music may have been played by persons acting in com-
plete good faith. 98 Yet each performance is the potential basis of a suit which
must result in a judgment for at least $250. The possibility of obtaining
S.C. 1924), aff'd, 2 F. (2d) 1020 (C. C.A. 4th, 1924); Witmark & Sons v. Calloway,
22 F. (2d) 412 (E. D. Tenn. 1927). But cf. Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 Fed. 592
(S.D. N.Y. 1918).
91. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 416.
92. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F. (2d) 829 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
93. Whether only the original transmitting station or all stations in the chain arc
liable for an infringement has apparently not yet been determined. For discussion of
the problem, see SHAFTER, op. cit. mipra note 64, at 259; Section 17 of the Duffy Bill
places liability for infringements by broadcasting chains upon the transmitting station,
See Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 480, 1120 et seq.
94. Id., at 416.
95. Id., at 373. The possibility of a suit for such infringement is, of course, remote,
but a very analogous situation arose in England where an unlicensed newsreel picture
of a parade picked up the band performance of a copyrighted song, and the newsreel
company was held liable for infringement. Hawkes & Son, Ltd. v. Paramount Film
Service, Ltd., [1934] 1 Ch. 593, (1934) 20 CORN. L. Q. 145; (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 370.
The Duffy Bill specifically exempts an infringer from liability for "the merely inci-
dental and not reasonably avoidable inclusion of a copyrighted work in a motion
picture or broadcast depicting or relating current events." § 17(g) (4). See Hearings,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 1092.
96. Cf. id., at 1135.
97. Id., at 441.
98. The most notorious instance was the withdrawal of the Warner Brothers pub-
lishing houses from ASCAP before the termination of their contract. For the facts and
discussion of the problems arising, see Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 372, 474;
Comment (1936) 7 Aia L. REv. 78. A compromise has been reached and the Warner
Bros. have since returned to the Society.
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results of this character is enhanced by the physical limitations under which
even ASCAP must work. No catalogue of songs is published, but licensees
are furnished only with a list of the Society members whose songs are covered
by the license.99
There seems to be little necessity for these harsh results, which have
created a tremendous animosity toward composers and their protective or-
ganizations. Several states have passed prohibitive laws aimed directly at
ASCAP. 00 The Federal Government instituted an anti-trust suit against
the Society which was not prosecuted to judgment, but which remains a
threat.' 01 Courts have seized upon the merest technicalities to throw out
suits brought under Section 25 as the only way to avoid the $250 damage
requirement. 0 2 As a result, the copyright owner has received nothing be-
cause the statute would have given him too much.
The amendment to Section 25 suggested in the Duffy Bill effectively removes
this source of irritation by deleting the minimum sum of 250. Moreover,
the proponents of the Bill strenuously contend that the elimination of this
clause will in no way impair the efficacy of copyright protection as developed
under the existing law. 10 The provision is still a statutory damage -clause.
It does not require proof of actual loss or damage. It merely leaves the
amount of the award to the discretion of the court, which shall be guided
by the two principles that the damages shall be " . . . just, proper, and
adequate, in view of the circumstances of the case . . . ," and that they
shall be " . . . sufficient to prevent their operation as a license to infringe
.... ." Although the first condition is too vague to satisfy the creators
of copyright works, the second provides assurance that the interests of
authors and composers are still paramount. All that the owner of a copy-
right will have to show in order to recover ample retribution for his loss
is infringement and the amount of his license fees. The court vili then
presumably take into consideration the possibility that the infringement
would never be discovered and will give an award sufficiently in excess of
the normal license rate to prevent the potential infringer from running this
risk. If the courts would uniformly enforce the measure of damages set
out in the provision, the adoption of this amendment would have little or
99. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 472.
100. Such statutes have been passed by five states. Fla. Gen. Act and Resolutions
(1937) c. 17807, p. 204; Mont. Laws (1937) c. 90; Neb. Sess. Laws (1937) c. 133;
Tenn. Pub. Acts (1937) c. 212; Wash. Sess. Laws (1937) c. 218. And see Hearings,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 1114 et seq.
101. N. Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1934, p. 15, col. 3. See Peaslee, The Effect of the
Federal "Anti-Trusit Laws" on Commerce its Patented and Copyrighted Articles (1915)
28 H1agv. L. Rrv. 394. Cf. Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E. D. Pa. 1922); Witmark
& Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E. D. S. C. 1924), aff'd, 2 F. (2d)
1020 (C. C.A. 4th, 1924).
102. Hearings, op. cit. stpra note 3, at 766.
103. See id., at 375, 481.
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no deleterious effect upon ASCAP or any other copyright owner. Indeed,
obviation of the harsh results arising from the existing law might prove of
considerable benefit to the Society by improving its relations with user organ-
izations.' 0 4
Actually, however, it is questionable whether the stringency of the provi-
sion is justified by the evils which it is designed to cure. Apparently the
only valid objection to the operation of the existing copyright law is the
charge that the minimum damage requirement results in harsh decisions in
cases of unavoidable infringement. But these comparatively rare cases are
likely to arise only in the marketing of performing rights in music, while
the abolition of the minimum damage provision would apply to all types
of copyright protection. The value of the present clause depends to a large
extent upon the certainty of its application in all cases of infringement. By
introducing an element of judicial discretion, this certainty will inevitably
disappear. Rather than jeopardize the entire copyright system resting upon
the protection afforded by the minimum damage clause, it would seem prefer-
able to retain this clause in substantially its present form but to exempt
specifically those instances in which the "infringer" could not reasonably
have known that his act constituted an infringement. 105 An amendment of
this kind would obviate the difficulties encountered by radio and other users
of copyright music'0 , and at the same time would afford ample protection
to the creators of copyright works. In no way would it affect ASCAP's
present system of copyright protection, for the letters sent to the various
potential licensees would give them actual knowledge before infringements
had taken place, Only in the case where knowledge of the infringement could
not possibly be obtained would an infringer escape liability under this amend-
ment, and in such cases there is little justification for imposing liability.
WVALTER L. PFORZHEIAERt
104. See id., at 247.
105. Section 17 of the Duffy Bill exempts certain incidental and unavoidable in-
fringements, but this provision applies only to news reels and broadcasts of current
events.
For a discussion of the feasibility of government regulation of license fees, see
Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 244.
106. If it is true that the existing minimum requirement of $250 determines the
rates which a copyright owner may charge, and if these rates are higher than the
value of the license to the user, there would seem to be no objection to lowering thig
sum, provided that the reduced amount would be sufficiently high to operate as a
deterrent to infringement. Indeed, a reduction of the minimum award has already been
suggested. See Hearings, op. cit. mtpra note 3, at 246.
tThird year student, Yale School of Law. This Comment was written in collabora-
tion with a member of the Editorial Board of the JotmAL.
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